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THE GEORGIA OPEN RECORDS LAW
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXCEPTION:
THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND OPEN RECORDS
I. INTRODUCTION

Given modern technology, individuals are legitimately concerned with privacy.
Not only does an expansive government bureaucracy collect and store information ranging from financial records to criminal histories, but, in addition, private
industry collects volumes of information for marketing and other purposes.
Privacy concerns are not new, however. According to Warren and Brandeis,
Anglo-American law began recognizing a right of privacy as early as the midnineteenth century.1 In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis pointed out the
need for the formal recognition of a tort remedy for violation of privacy.2 The
Georgia Supreme Court recognized a right of privacy in 1905.3 If the law was
needed to protect against invasions of privacy at the turn of the nineteenth
century, protections of privacy are even more critical today when video cameras,
' Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privay, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 n.1
(1890) (arguing that the recognition of a right to privacy in tort would not be "judicial legislation"
but "merely another application of an existing rule" and citing numerous nineteenth century
"privacy" cases based upon property and contract theories); see Michael Hoefges et al., Privay Rights
Versus FOLA Disclosure Polfy: The 'Uses and Effects" Double Standard in Access to Personal#y-Identifiable
Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 45-47 (2003) ("The threads of
privacy are woven throughout American jurisprudence ....Although the Constitution does not
provide an explicit right of individual privacy, the Supreme Court has said there is an implied right
of privacy grounded primarily in the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment's 'concept of
personal liberty.' "); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivay, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739 (1989) (arguing
that the analysis in privacy cases was focused on the wrong thing in "ask[ing] whether there is a
'fundamental right' to perform" the act at issue, and saying that "the fundament of the right to
privacy is not to be found in the supposed fundamentality of what the law proscribes [rather] [i]t is
to be found in what the law imposes"). Rubenfeld goes on to say, "the right to privacy... attaches
to the rightholder's own actions... [and] is not informational but substantive, immunizing certain
conduct.., from state proscription or penalty." Id. at 740.
2 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (attributing greater invasions into privacy to "[r]ecent
inventions and business methods[,J ...[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise[,J ...
and numerous mechanical devices").
See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905). The court noted that:
The right of privacy within certain limits is a right derived from natural law,
recognized by the principles of municipal law, and guarantied to persons in this
state both by the Constitutions of the United States and of the state of Georgia,
in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty
except by due process of law.
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camera phones, listening and recording devices, computer databases, the Internet,
and changing "business methods" such as increasingly sophisticated data
collection practices by marketers make invasions of privacy an almost constant
threat.
In addition to awareness of privacy rights, citizens of the United States have
long been concerned with transparent government. Political theorists and
politicians have long recognized the importance of transparency4 and believe it
critical to the preservation of liberty.' As government grew in size, federal and
state lawmakers enacted laws to ensure the openness of government and the
availability of information to its citizens.6 Every increase in the size of the
government increases the need for access to government information in order to
maintain transparency.
These two concerns-privacy and government transparency-are often at
odds, but a third concern has added further complexity to this area of the law.
This new concern is technology. Lawmakers are concerned with technological
advances, such as electronic recordkeeping and electronic commerce (or ecommerce), with good reason. Technology increases efficiency and expands
capabilities. Additionally, many expect electronic commerce to become a huge
business. According to one estimate, global electronic commerce revenues could
reach $6.8 trillion by 2005.' This expansion of electronic commerce is the driving
force behind electronic signature legislation.
Lawmakers have designed electronic signature laws to foster the continued
development and increased use of new technology in the field of electronic
contracts and sales. Electronic commerce and advances in technology have come

Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives."); seealso Hoefges et at., supra note 1, at 9-10 ("Legislators noted that transparent government,
subject to public and press scrutiny and evaluation, has a long and historic tradition in the nation.").
s John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), quoted in State ex rel. Beacon
Journal Publ'g Co. v. City of Akron, 640 N.E.2d 164,168 (Ohio 1994). President Adams remarked:
Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people,
who have a right... and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right, an
indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and
envied kind of knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers.
6 See Statement of the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information Provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 2 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc. 895 (July 11, 1966) ("[Democracy
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No one
should be able to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury
to the public interest.'), cited in Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privaff and the Pubis Right to Know:
The "Central Purpose" ofthe Freedom ofInformation Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 46 (1994).
' Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Electronic Commerce: This is Not Your Father's Oldsmobile, 26 RUTGERS L.
REc. 7 (2002).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/8

2

Van Cise: The Georgia Open Records Law Electronic Signature Exception: The

2005]

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXCEPTION

so rapidly, however, that the law has been unable to keep pace with such changes.8
Ironically, problems have arisen from legislators' recognition of the law's inability
to keep pace with such rapid changes. The instance at issue in this Note is the
negative impact of lawmakers' attempts to pass laws that are technology-neutral
on Georgia's open records law. New electronic signature laws, while they may
appropriately respond to concerns of rapid changes in technology, have
insufficiently dealt with the timeless issues of government transparency and
individual privacy.
The term "privacy" has come to embody numerous doctrines in the law. This
Note will focus primarily on information privacy, discussing an apparent flaw in
the open records law of Georgia. Specifically, the Georgia Legislature recently
added a disclosure exception for electronic signatures, an exception which runs
counter to the history and purpose of the Georgia open records acts and creates
an overly broad exception to the prior law. Georgia has, by implication, created
a new privacy exception in its open records law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

9

The federal government uses the following definition for purposes of
government statistics: "E-commerce is any transaction completed over a
computer-mediated network that involves the transfer of ownership or rights to
use goods or services. ' ° Furthermore, the Census Bureau points out that
"electronic agreement, not payment, is the key determinant of an e-commerce
transaction."" The United States Census Bureau estimate of domestic retail
electronic commerce sales for just the second quarter of 2004 was $15.7 billion. 2
Electronic commerce as a percentage of retail sales has increased from 0.7% in

'See, e.g.,
Sarah E. Roland, The Uniform Ekctronic Signaturesin GlobalandNationalCommerce Act:
Removing Barersto E-CommerceorJust Replacng Them with Pnvay andSecur ty Issues?, 35 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 625, 626 ("The lagging pace of change in the legal system is in stark contrast to the Internet's
explosive growth.").
9 Seegeneral#THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN ELECTRONIC

COMMERCE, at http://cism.bus.utexas.edu (last visited Jan. 17, 2005); THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY
MARTIN P. CATHERWOOD LIBRARY WEBSITE GUIDE TO ECOMMERCE, at http://www.ilr.cornell.

edu/library/subjectGuides/ecommerce.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
" Barbara M. Fraumeni et al., Government Statistics: E-Commerce and the Electronic
Economy (paper prepared for presentation to the Federal Economic Statistics Advisory Committee)
(June 15, 2000), availableat http://www.census.gov/econ/www/ecomn2.htm#statistics.
'1

Id.

12 CENSUS BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING AND TRADE

INVENTORIES AND SALES (2005), availableat http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html.
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the fourth quarter of 1999 to almost two percent of total retail sales in the first
quarter of 2004.3 While business conducted over a computer does not represent
a large portion of the current economy, some expect that it will.' 4 Perhaps these
expectations are reasonable given the above statistics. In any case, it is with these
to further the growth
expectations in mind that legislators have enacted legislation
5
of electronic commerce both domestically and globally.'
B. ELECTRONIC AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES

1. Definifion of Terms.16 A signature is "[a]ny name, mark, or writing used with
the intention of authenticating a document."'" An electronic signature is defined
by the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) as "the execution of a
sound, symbol or process with the intent to sign."" 8 In contrast to a traditional

13 Id.
" See Mirzaian, supra note 7 ("[W]orldwide e-commerce revenues are expected to reach $6.8
trillion by 2005.").
Is See, e.g., Julian Epstein, Ckaning up a Mess on the Web: A Comparison of Federaland State Digital
Signature Laws, 5 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 491. President Clinton stated:
The [E-Sign] Act will open up new frontiers of economic opportunity ....The
new law will give fresh momentum to what is already the longest economic
expansion in our history, an expansion driven largely by the phenomenal growth
in information technologies, particularly the Internet.... [P]roductivity gains are
rippling throughout our economy.... Perhaps no invention since the railroad
has had such potential to expand our opportunities and broaden our horizons-I
would argue, more profound potential.
Gregory Todd Jones, ElectronicSignaturesand Records: Permitthe Use of EleronicSignaturesand Records
Even When a Statute, Regulation, or Other Rule of Law Specifies a Non-ElectronicType of Signature or Record
18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 6, 7 (2001) ("[A] troubling question remained for states across the nation
which were grappling with the issue of evolving electronic transactions. With the speed of
technological innovation, how would one define an electronic signature in such a way as to promote
innovation.").
16 While the terminology can be confusing, it is critical to an understanding of the law and the
topics discussed in this Note. See Mirzaian, supranote 7, at Section (II)(A)(4) (a) ("The terms 'digital
signature' and 'electronic signature' are often confused because of the common misconception that
they are synonymous.').
17 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1415 (8th ed. 2004) (citing to the Uniform Commercial Code).
1 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(8) (1999)], available at http://www.law.penn.edu/bll/
ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm. Comment 7 to the UETA definition of the term "electronic
signature" is helpful. It states, "No specific technology need be used in order to create a valid
signature." Id. Furthermore, Comment 7 explains that a voice on an answering machine, a name
as part of an electronic mail communication, or even the firm name on a facsimile, could each be an
electronic signature when paired with the requisite intention. Id; see also O.C.G.A. 5 10-12-3 (2000)
(" 'Electronic signature' means a signature created, transmitted, received, or stored by electronic
means" and" 'Electronic' means, without limitation, analog, digital, electronic, magnetic, mechanical,
optical, chemical, electromagnetic, electromechanical, electrochemical, or other similar means.").
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signature and an electronic signature, a digital signature is not really a signature at
all because it does not require intent. Rather, a digital signature is a specific
technology used to provide assurance that the message sent is not intercepted or
compromised en route to the intended recipient and that identifies and authenticates the sender) 9 It is important to recognize that a digital signature can be an
electronic signature when that digital signature is used with the intent to sign.
2. Electronic and DigitalSignature Legislation. The Utah Digital Signatures Act,
adopted in 1995, was the first piece of legislation designed to create a standard for
electronic signatures.2" The Utah legislature chose to enact laws giving validity
only to cryptography-based digital signatures 21 as opposed to other state
legislatures that created broad, technology-neutral electronic signature laws.
Soon after the passage of the Utah act, New York adopted a similar standard in
its Electronic Signatures and Records Act.23 The American Bar Association's
Digital Signature Guidelines,24 while not intended to serve as a model for a digital
25
signature statute, had an impact on legislatures passing electronic signature laws

19 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FORCERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, availableathttp://

www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsg-toc.htn-l. The term "Digital Signature" has been defined as "[a]
secure digital code attached to an electronically transmitted message that uniquely identifies and
authenticates the sender." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1415; see also Thomas J.

Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving With Change: ElectronicSignature Legislationasa VehicleAdvaneing

E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 723, 730-31 (1999)

(" 'Digital signature' is
simply a term for one technology-specific type of electronic signature. It involves the use of public
key cryptography to 'pign' a message, and is perhaps the one type of electronic signature that has
generated the most business and technical efforts, as well as legislative responses."); UNIF. ELEC.
TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra note 18, cmt. 7 (revealing that the primary distinction between an
electronic and digital signature is that "[o]ne may use a digital signature with the requisite intention,
or one may use the private key solely as an access device with no intention to sign, or otherwise
accomplish a legally binding act"). Put simply, a digital signature involves the use of specific
technology to verify and decrypt a record, whereas an electronic signature involves some electronic
symbol, which might be a digital signature, and intent.
20 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-504 (1999); Roland, supranote 8; Smedinghoff & Bro,
supra note 19, at 726.
21 UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 to -504; Smedinghoff & Bro, supra note 19, at 725.
2 See supra note 18 and accompanying text and infra notes 26, 28, 31 and accompanying text
(discussing E-Sign, UETA, the Florida Electronic Signatures Act, and the Georgia Electronic
Records and Signatures Act).
2 Electronic Signatures and Records Act, N.Y. TECH. LAw § 101-109 (2003); Roland, supra
note 8. The law passed in 1999 and became effective March 2000. Id.
24 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 19.
2 Id. at 20; Edward D. Kania, TheABA 's DigitalSignatureGuidelines:An ImperfectSolution to Digital

Signatureson the Internet,7 COMMON L. CONSPECTUS 297,301,304 (1999); Smedinghoff & Bro, supra
note 19, at 726.
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and may have contributed to the adoption of digital signatures as the only
accepted means of validating a contract by electronic signature.
In contrast to Utah, Florida and Georgia passed less restrictive legislation.
The Florida legislature recognized both digital signatures and electronic signatures
in their broader sense in its Electronic Signature Act of 199626 and has since
adopted the similarly broad UETA. 2' Georgia also enacted general electronic
signature legislation not restricted solely to electronic signatures adopted using
digital signature protocol.2 After the aforementioned state laws, the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws created the UETA,
employing a general, technology-neutral standard similar to the standard applied
by the Georgia and Florida legislatures.29
In 1999, the federal government considered legislation similar to that of Utah
and New York but never passed the bill.3" In 2000, the federal government took
action by passing the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
(E-Sign Act).3 To some extent, this federal legislation creates a national standard
for electronic signature legislation. 32 The E-Sign Act contains a limited, express
preemption of state law.33 States may avoid preemption by adopting the UETA.34
States may have unique legislation only to the extent that the state law is

26 Electronic Signature Act of 1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-224 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. ch. 668.001-668.006 (2004)); Roland, supra note 8, at 629.
27 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 668.50 (2004).
2 Georgia Electronic Records and Signatures Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 10-12-1 to -5 (2000 & Supp.

2004) (enacted by 1997 Ga. Laws 1052-1056 and amended by 2001 Ga. Laws 983); see also Jones,
spra note 15 (detailing the history of Georgia electronic signature law).
18.
30 Roland, supra note 8, at 630; see Digital Signature Act of 1999, H.R. 1572, 106th Cong. (1st
29 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra note

Sess. 1999).
31 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229,114 Stat.
464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006 (2000)).
32 See Janet P. Knaus & Timothy E. Foley, Information Technology: ElectronicRecords &
Signatures:
The FederalE-SignAct and Michigan UETA Place them on LegalParwith their Paperand Ink Counterparts,
80 MICH. B.J. 39, 41 (July 2001). Knaus and Foley note that:
E-Sign contains an unusual form of a limited, express preemption of state law.
Rather than providing that the federal law preempts all inconsistent state laws,
E-Sign sets forth the limited circumstances in which state laws will not be
preempted. E-Sign explicitly does not preempt a state enactment... that adopts
the official version of the Uniform Act. A departure from the official version
may avoid preemption if it is consistent with the substantive provisions of E-Sign
and is technology neutral.
31 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1) (preceding the requirements with, "A State... may modify,
limit, or supersede the provisions of section 7001 of this tide with respect to State law on# if such
statute, regulation, or rule of law") (emphasis added).

14

15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1).
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technology-neutral and does not conflict with the E-Sign Act.3" The important
portion of the E-Sign Act in relation to state electronic transaction law is as
follows:
[W]ith respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce-(l) a signature, contract, or other record relating to
such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a
contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or
electronic record was used in its formation.36
After the mandate of the E-Sign Act, legislation must be technology-neutral
with respect to electronic signature legislation. 3' The rationale behind the
requirement of technology-neutral legislation is that, in order for private industry
to invest in the development of better technology, it is critical that the law not
favor one specific technology such as digital signature technology.38
C. OPEN RECORDS LAWS: HISTORY AND POLICY

Assistant Attorney Generals Cohen and Manis announced that "[g]ood
government has become increasingly synonymous with open government.... ,,31
Open records laws make government documents and information available to the

" Id. 7002(a) (defining the technology neutral requirement in § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii)); see, e.g.,
O.C.G.A. § 10-12-2(b) (Supp. 2004) ("The General Assembly finds that this chapter is consistent
with [E-Sign] . . . and therefore continues to have the full force of law. The General Assembly
further reaffirms its intent that this chapter continue to have the full force of law.").
36 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (a).
3 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a). The statute states that:
[A] State statute, regulation or other rule of law may modify, limit, or supersede
the provisions of section 7001 of this tide with respect to State law only if such
statute, regulation, or rule of law [enacts the UETA or] specifies the alternative
procedures or requirements for the use or acceptance (or both) of electronic
records or electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or
enforceability of contracts or other records, if... such alternative procedures or
requirements do not require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the
implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification
for performing the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving,
communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signatures.
38 Smedinghoff & Bro, supra note 19, at 761.
"9Mark H. Cohen & Stephanie B. Manis, Geotgia's Open Records and Open Meetings Laws: A
Continued March Toward Government in the Sunshine, 40 MERCER L. REv. 1, 1 (1988).
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public4 ° and attempt to encourage public access to government information to
increase "public awareness about the decision making process."41 At the same
time, these laws recognize that some limits are necessary
to prevent disclosures
42
that might threaten the decisionmaking process itself.
Professor Daniel Solove describes four general functions of government
transparency as provided through open records law.43 First, transparency
facilitates public knowledge and understanding of the government and its
functions.' Second, transparency makes information about government officials
available that, in turn, allows the public to examine and evaluate government
activity. 5 Third, transparency facilitates social transactions. For example, public
records are needed to enable transfer of real property because transparency allows
people to trace ownership and title in land.46 Fourth, transparency makes
gathering personal information possible for other purposes.4 7 For example, law
enforcement officials use public records to locate criminals and "deadbeat
parents" and to investigate crimes, parents use public records to investigate
babysitters or child care professionals, and employers use public records to screen
potential employees."
Exceptions to disclosure exist not only to protect the functions of government
but also to protect privacy.49 Many open government statutes are modified on a

4 See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 (2002); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 119 (2004 & Supp. 2005).
41 Cohen & Manis, supra note 39, at 2; see, e.g., Cate et al., supra note 6, at 65 ("The FOIA was
designed to protect and advance three goals: first and most important, ensure public access to the
information necessary to evaluate the conduct of government officials; second, ensure public access
to information concerning public policy; and third, protect against secret laws, rules and
decisionmaking.").
42 Cohen & Manis, supra note 39, at 2.
4" Daniel J. Solove, Access andAggregation: Pubc Records, Privagy and the Constituion, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1137, 1173 (2002).
IId. at 1173-75. Professor Solove writes:
By promoting awareness of the workings of government, transparency serves a
"watchdog" function .... Courts and commentators have pointed out that the
Watergate Scandal might never have been uncovered if the original bail hearing
had been closed to the press because reporters . . . would not have been
suspicious that expensive attorneys were representing the burglars.
41

Id. at 1175.

' Id. (giving other examples and specifically noting that "[p]ublic record information is useful
in locating witnesses for judicial proceedings as well as locating heirs to estates"). Solove goes on
to state that "[A]ccess to public records can allow individuals and entities to track down individuals
they want to sue and to obtain the necessary information to serve them with process." Id.
47 Id.
41 Id. at

1175-76.

See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (delineating nine exceptions to
the FOIA, two of which, exceptions 6 and 7(C), relate to privacy); O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (2002 &
41
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regular basis,50 which indicates that privacy may be the motivating factor more
often than concerns about protecting the functions of government.
1. FederalLaw. The Administrative Procedure Act5 ' governed requests for
federal records until the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in
1966.52 In the year following its passage, the original FOIA was amended to
include nine categories of exemption.53 Federal courts initially allowed federal
agencies to apply the exceptions broadly, 4 but following the Watergate scandal,
Congress expressed its discontent over such broad application by amending the
FOIAin 1974. ss Congress further amended the FOIA in 1976,1981, and 1986.6
In 1996, Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act that
mandated access to agency records contained in databases.5 7
Congress expressed the purpose of the FOIA as follows:
[T]he purpose.., is to require agencies of the Federal Government
to make certain agency information available for public inspection
and copying and to establish and enable enforcement of the right of
any person to obtain access to the records of such agencies, subject
to statutory exemptions, for any public or private purpose."

Supp. 2004) (containing numerous exceptions for privacy).
" For example, Florida has amended its open records law exceptions every year from 1977 to
2004. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 119.07 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
s' Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946)), repealed by
Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Star. 383 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552).
52 Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552).
51 Pub. L. No 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (effective July 5, 1967) (codified as amended 5 U.S.C. 5
552 (2000)).
-4 Cate et al., supra note 6, at 47.
51 See Cate et al., supra note 6, at 48 (providing specifics of the 1974 amendment).
56 Id. (stating that the 1986 amendment "directly contradicted Congress's attempts to force
agency disclosure" but that "[w]hile the Act no longer reflects the 'disclosure at any cost' belief that
resonated from Watergate ... it still favors disclosure well beyond the 1966 Act").
" Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110
Stat. 3049 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)) ("For purposes of this section, the term...
'record' and any other term used in this section in reference to information includes any information
that would be an agency record subject to the requirements of this section when maintained by an
agency in any format, including an electronic format.'); Hoefges et al., supra note 1, at n.22.
58 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 § 2(a) (noting the success of
the act, stating that "the [FOIA] has led to the disclosure of waste, fraud, abuse, and wrongdoing
in the federal government... identification of unsafe consumer products, harmful drugs, and serious
health hazards," and encouraging agencies to "use new technology to enhance public access to
agency records and information").
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2. FloridaOpen RecordsLaw.5 9 Even though Florida codified its public records
law after the passage of the FOIA, "a legislative policy on public records can be
traced back ... [to] at least 1909. '' 60 In 1985, the attorney general of Florida
wrote, "The government of Florida has been one of the most open anywhere in
the world since the enactment of a more comprehensive open meetings law and
public records law in 1967. , 6 1 This seems to remain true today, as Florida has
expressly supported the move to electronic record keeping and stated its intent
not to limit public access.62 In 2004, Florida updated its statement on electronic
record keeping. 63 To further the state policy "that all state, county, and municipal
records [shall be] open for personal inspection by any person," 64 Florida provides
for immediate hearing of actions filed, requires agencies to comply with court
orders within forty-eight hours, and only allows for stay orders when making
records public "will result in significant damage." 6 Even when an exemption
applies, government agencies must produce the record, redacting only the
portions of the record to which an exemption applies.66 When not producing the
complete record, the agency representative must "state the basis of the
exemption... including the statutory citation.., and, if requested by the person
seeking the right under this subsection to inspect, examine, or copy the record,

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
0 Jim Smith, The PublicRecords Law and the Sunshine Law: No Attorney-Client PrivilegePer Se, and
limitedAttorny Work ProductExemption, 14 STETSON L. REv. 493,494 n.3 (1985) (stating that "1909
Fla. Laws 5942 provided in pertinent part that all state, county and municipal records shall at all
times be open for a personal inspection, and that the penalty for violation of the act was removal or
impeachment").
61 Id. at 493; see alsoPaul M. Schwartz, Privay andPartiation:PersonalInformationand Public Sector
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 607 (1995) (pointing out that the Florida
constitution explicitly makes open government statutes superior to its state constitutional right of
privacy).
62 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01, supersededb FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (Supp. 2005) (effective
Oct. 1, 2004). The statute states:
The Legislature finds that, given advancements in technology, providing access
to public records by remote electronic means is an additional method of access
that agencies should strive to provide to the extent feasible [and] . . . that
automation of public records must not erode the right of access to those records.
As each agency increases its use of and dependence on electronic recordkeeping,
each agency must ensure reasonable access to records electronically maintained.
See also Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private lives from Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict Between
ConstitutionalPrivacy and the Accountabih'i Principk of Democracy, 11 COMMON L. CONSPECTUS 71, 94
(2003) (stating that Florida open records laws have been regarded as a model for other states).
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (giving guidance on issues not addressed in the prior law such as
providing data in a common format).
59

14

Id. 11l9.01(1).

SId. § 119.11.
Id. § 119.07(1)(b).
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[the agency representative] shall state in writing6 7and with particularity the reasons
for the conclusion that the record is exempt.
Despite its policies favorable to government transparency, Florida does have
restrictions on access to public records. 68 These exemptions include "[tihe home
addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, and photographs of active
or former law enforcement personnel"69 as well as phone company records that
include personal information." Indicative of the change inherent in this field of
law is the fact that Florida has amended the portion of its open record law that
provides for exceptions every year from 1977 to 2004.1
3. Ohio Open RecordsLaw. In 1963, the Ohio open records statute codified "an
emerging common law rule" that granted access to public records.7 2 Ohio's
Public Records Act, like Florida's, provides rules to ensure access to public
records.73 Ohio law defines public records broadly and has only a few disclosure
limitations, which Ohio courts interpret strictly. 74 Despite Ohio's tendency to
liberally disclose records, the state supreme court in Beacon JournalPublishing Co.
v. City ofAkron held that although Ohio had no social security number exception,
the U.S. Constitution mandated such an exception to the Public Records Law. 5

67

Id.

68

See id.

119.07(6)(a)-(6)(jj) (defining the records and information exempt from disclosure

under the law); Mary K. Kraemer, Exemptionsto the Sunshine Law and the PubicRecords Law: Have They
Impaired Open Government in Florida?,8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 265, 280-94 (1980).
69 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.07(6)(i)(1).
70 Id. § 119.07(6)(r).
71

Id. 119.07.

David S. Jackson, Piva-y and Ohio's Public RecordsAct, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (1997).
73 Id. at 116 (stating that Ohio's Public Records Act is "within the most liberal class of public
72

records acts").
74 Id.; State ex rel.Lindsay v. Dwyer, 670 N.E.2d 1375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("[P]ublic policy...
requires a liberal construction of provisions defining public records and a strict construction of the
exceptions.").
75 640 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio 1994). The court stated:
We find today that the high potential for fraud and victimization caused by the
unchecked release of city employee SSNs outweighs the minimal information
about governmental processes gained through the release of the SSNs. Our
holding . . . is intended to preserve one of the fundamental principles of
American constitutional law--ours is a government of limited power. We
conclude that the United States Constitution forbids disclosure under the
circumstances of this case.
But see State ex rel Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. City of Akron, 640 N.E.2d 164, 170, 172 (Ohio
1994) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had no legal authority for its decision and
was engaging in judicial activism). In his dissent,Justice Douglas pointed out that the majority cited
neither Ohio law nor any federal statute or provision of the U.S. Constitution. Id. He further argued
that the majority's balancing of interests was contrary to Ohio law because it is the legislature's role
to "balance the competing concerns of the public's right to know and individual citizens' tight to
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4. Georia Open Records Law. Although Georgia has had an open records act
since 1959,76 the Georgia Legislature did not define the term "public records"
until 1988,7 indicating that Georgia was not necessarily the leader in the
development of open records law.
The stated purpose of the Georgia Open Records Act is "to encourage public
access to government information and to foster confidence in government
through openness to the public. ' 7 8 Even in the wake of the Supreme Court's
holding that the FOIA does not require disclosure of criminal information "rap
sheets," Georgia amended its law to provide for the disclosure of that information.79 Unlike the FOIA, however, the Georgia Open Records Act "mandates the
nondisclosure" of information excepted by the Act."° This reveals that Georgia
has stronger privacy protection than the federal government,81 at least as far as
government agencies releasing information to requesters of open records is
concerned.
D. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION COLLECTION AND PUBLIC RECORDS: INCREASE
IN GOVERNMENT SIZE AND ADVANCE IN TECHNOLOGY

The federal government collects revenue, funds social welfare programs, and
regulates many aspects of the lives of its citizens." In order to effectively
complete these tasks, the government must collect volumes of personal
information.83 State governments perform similar tasks, which also require the

keep private certain information that becomes part of the records of public offices" and chose not
to provide a social security number exception to the Public Records Law even though it had
addressed social security numbers in other portions of the code. Id.
76 Cohen & Manis, supra note 39, at 3.
77 id.
" McFrugal Rental of Riverdale, Inc. v. Garr, 418 S.E.2d 60, 61 (Ga. 1992) (citing Athens
Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 263 S.E.2d 128 (Ga. 1980)).
" Beall, supra note 6, at 1293-94 ("Under the 1995 Amendments, the Georgia legislature has
made a policy choice to favor disclosure-albeit limited disclosure--over privacy.'); see also 1995 Ga.
Laws 633 (act to amend the law relating to the Georgia Crime Information Center).
0 Bowers v. Shelton, 453 S.E.2d 741,743 (Ga. 1995) (emphasis removed) (citing Harris v. Cox
Enters., Inc., 348 S.E.2d 448 (1986)); see also Schwartz, supra note 61, at 593 ("An essential concept
regarding the FOIA is that it sometimes requires the government to disclose information, but never
requires nondisclosur.');Solove, supranote 43, at 1162 ("FOIA does not require that the government
withhold information.").
81 But see Schwartz, supra note 61, at 593-94 (indicating that the Privacy Act can block disclosure
to a third party even though the FOIA does not require disclosure).
82 Lillian R. BeVier, Information about Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on
Mechanismsfor Privay Protection,4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 455, 456 (1995).
83 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1989) ("The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare
and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and
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collection of personal information. 4 Open records laws make much of this
information public.8
Prior to advances in technology such as databases and the Internet, requesters
of government documents had to visit the governmental department that held the
record sought, identify the record or information requested, and then hope that
the record or information could be located.86 Assuming the agency could fulfill
the request, the requester would then examine the record, perhaps make a copy,
and return the record." Today, information is much more available, both in the
form of electronic databases at governmental agencies 8 and on the Internet. s9

the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of
information.").
4 See Solove, supra note 43, at 1143-44; Daniel J. Solove, Privagy and Power: Computer Databases
and Metaphorsfor Information Privagy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1403 (2001) ("States maintain public
records of arrests, births, criminal proceedings, marriages, divorces, property ownership, voter
registration, workers compensation, and scores of other types of records. State licensing regimes
mandate that records be kept on numerous professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers,
insurance agents, nurses, police, accountants, and teachers.'). For example, State Motor Vehicle
Departments collect personal information that, prior to the passage of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA), many states sold to private entities. See infra note 107.
s See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 43.
Rosemary Barnes, Technology; Snooping Online is Big Business; IncreasedAccessto Onkne Information
HasGiven Birth to Firms Spedalingin Catalogingand Selling PublicInformation,SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS, Aug. 28, 2004, at 7H; Jackson, supra note 72, at 110; Solove, supra note 43, at 1139.
17 Solove, supra note 43, at
1139.
"8 Hoefges et al., supra note 1, at 5 ("While technology can make access to electronically-stored
information faster and cheaper, it can also make invasions of personal privacy far easier.'').
s At least one state legislature has mandated the placement of public records on the Internet.
See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-122 (2005), which states:
The commission shall administer the [public access] fund and spend monies in
the fund to purchase, install and maintain an improved data processing
system .... The data processing system shall be designed to allow direct, on-line
access by any person at a remote location to all public records that are filed with
the commission pursuant to this title and title 29, chapter 4.
Numerous states permit records to be made available by remote access. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.01(e); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.874(6) (2001); MD. CODE ANN., Maryland Rules, § 1610 08(a)(2)(D) (2005); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.2(d) (2005) ("[A]n agency may make its public
records available through any publicly accessible electronic means.'); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1515A-11 (1) (2004) (court records); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3122.2 (2004) ("The commissioner of the
revenue may provide remote access, including access through the global information system known
as the Internet, to all nonconfidential public records maintained by his office.'). Georgia does not
require public records to be on the Internet, but personally identifiable information is easily
accessible. See, e.g., Letter from Russell W. Hinton, State Auditor, Department of Audits and
Accounts to the General Assembly, availabk at http://www.audits.state.ga.us/esa/index.html
(allowing access to salary and travel reimbursement information for state employees simply by
clicking "I understand: Proceed to the Salary and Travel Supplement" link at the bottom of the
page); see also GUIDESTAR: THE NATIONAL DATABASE OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, athttp://
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The requester can now acquire the same information at a lower cost and in far
less time.90 Requesters can collect and sort large volumes of information in a
fashion that would not have been possible if requesters were required to look
through paper files. 91 Since the advent of the Internet, a person can search online
databases of public information that were previously legally available in paper
form but were, for all practical purposes, unavailable to all but the most diligent.
The fact that information is stored electronically means that more information
may be kept for longer periods of time, if not indefinitely. 92 Despite the
differences in accessibility and retention of records, the federal government does
not treat computerized records differently than paper records, 93 and neither does
Georgia."
E. RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The law recognizes the right of privacy in numerous areas, and there is some
overlap between the different realms of privacy.9 There is a right of privacy in

www.guidestar.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) (providing access to IRS forms for nonprofit
organizations and including features such as a "salary search').
90See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 156 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:
The result of [Tax Analysts's] now-successful effort in this litigation is to impose
the cost of obtaining the court orders and opinions upon the Government and
thus upon taxpayers generally. There is no question that this material is available
elsewhere. But it is quicker and more convenient.., for respondent to have the
Department do the work and search its files and produce the items than it is to
apply to the respective court clerks.
91 Id.
92

Solove, supra note 43, at 1154.

9'Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 552(a)(2)(D) ("Each agency, in accordance with
published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying... copies of all records,
regardless of form or format.').
94 Requests for computer generated information in light of the Open Records Act, 89 Op. Att'y
Gen. (Ga.) No. 32, at 74 (1989) ("If public information not otherwise excluded or exempted is
sought in a request and may be called up under an existing [computer] program, the Agency must
comply.').
"sSee Paul M. Schwartz, Pmpery, Privay, andPersonalData,117 HARV.L. REV. 2055, 2058 (2004)
("Decisional and information privacy are not unrelated."); Solove, supra note 84, at 1431 ("Much of

privacy law is interrelated.").
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tort law,96 a Fourth Amendment right of privacy,9" and a Constitutional right to
privacy derived from the 5th and 14th Amendment.9" This Note, however, will
focus on the area of privacy termed "information privacy."
F. INFORMATION PRIVACY

Information privacy in its fullest sense comes from neither the Constitution
nor from tort law. Rather, information privacy, to the extent it exists, comes
predominantly from statutes.
1. ConstitutionalInformation Privacy: Whalen v. Roe and Progeny. Whalen v. Roe
is generally considered the first Supreme Court case to acknowledge information
privacy, though the Court did not use the phrase. 99 Whalen announced that two
interests are constitutionally protected, "the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and... the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions."'" The Court recognized information
privacy in the form of an "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" but
found that the Constitution only imposes a duty to "avoid unreasonable
disclosure.'' ° The Supreme Court affirmed its Whalen decision in Nixon v.
of
Administrator of GeneralServices.10 2 The weakness in this constitutional 0right
3
disclosure.'
in
interest
public
the
by
outweighed
be
can
it
that
privacy is

96 Solove, supranote 43, at n.259, dlingRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652A (1977) ("The

privacy torts are often referred to collectively as 'invasion of privacy' and consist of (1) intrusion
upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light or 'publicity'; and (4) appropriation.'); see also Solove, supra note 84, at 1432-34 (explaining how the existing privacy torts fail to
provide appropriate information privacy).
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to
know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."); see also id. at 350 ("[T'he
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its
protections go further and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.').
" See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
99 Whalen, 429 U.S. 589; Halstuk, supra note 62, at 79 ("Whalen remains the principal decision
concerning constitutional protection of information privacy.").
100 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
10' Solove, supra note 84, at 1436; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
102 Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Solove, supra note 84, at 1437.
103 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457 (agreeing with the district court that the significant public interest in
preserving the materials outweighed Nixon's privacy interest, which was "quite small"); Whakn, 429
U.S. at 602-04 (rejecting appellee's argument that "the knowledge that the information is readily
available in a computerized file creates a genuine concern that causes some persons to decline needed
medication" in light of the numerous disclosures required in healthcare, finding that the state has
not deprived any individual of the right to decide independently to acquire and to use needed
medication, and holding "that neither the immediate nor the threatened impact of the patient-
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Related to the notion of information privacy is a right to anonymity. There
is Supreme Court jurisprudence protecting anonymity,1 but that line of cases
does not ensure information privacy. Since the 1977 cases of Whalen and Nixon,
the Supreme Court has not ruled on information privacy as a constitutionally
protected right.
2. Statutory Protection ofInformation Privagy. In contrast to the Supreme Court's
relative inactivity in this area, Congress has passed numerous statutes regarding
the issue of privacy. With the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress indicated, among
other things, that "the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information
technology... has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur
from any collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of personal
information."10' Since then, statutory protection of information privacy regarding
private entities has come about on an ad hoc basis." 6 In 1994, in response to
state practices of selling information to private entities, Congress passed the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). °7 The DPPA prohibits states from
selling motor vehicle records.'0 8 Professor Daniel Solove points out the
importance of this legislation and gives examples of the large sums of money
offered and paid to the states for motor vehicle information prior to the passage

identification requirements ... on either the reputation or the independence of patients . . . is
sufficient to constitute an invasion ofany right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment");
see also Marc Rotenberg, Restoring a PubicInterest Vision of Law in the Age of the Internet,2004 DUKE L.
& TECH. REv. 7 ("[T]he U.S. Constitution doesn't always provide the best material for privacy
protection.").
104Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley
v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995); Talley v. California 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
105Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(2), 88 Star. 1896; see also Solove, supranote 43,
at 1172 ("The privacy protection that currently exists for public records is largely designed for a
world of paper records and has been slow to adapt to an age where information can be downloaded
from the Internet in an instant.").
'06 Stephen R. Bergerson, E-Commere Privay and the Black Ho/s of Cyberpace, 27 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1527, 1537 ("The existing federal statutes that protect consumer privacy from private
intrusions are the result of a reactionary and piecemeal approach.").
107Driver's Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2721-2725 (2000)).
108 Id § 2721. The statute states:
A State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor
thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person
or entity: (1) personal information . .. about any individual obtained by the
department in connection with a motor vehicle record [except for limited
permissible uses or] (2) highly restricted personal information ... about any
individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record,
without the express consent of the person to whom such information applies,
except [in limited circumstances].
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of this federal law. °9 Other federal privacy laws include Title V of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act,110 the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,1 the
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970,12 and the Videotape Privacy Protection Act."3
of
Although the federal government has been the primary actor in the field
4
privacy, state legislatures have also created statutory privacy protections.
3. Technology Privacy Legislation. Privacy legislation exists also in the area of
technology. In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) in order "to update and clarify federal privacy protections and
standards in light of... new computer and telecommunications technologies....
[including] electronic mail ("e-mail") [and] data transmission through computer
The subsequent passage of the Children's Online Privacy
networks.""'
Protection Act in 1998 reveals Congress's concern for the negative effects of
information collection by website operators and online services on children." 6

109 Solove, supra note 43, at 1150. Solove notes:

For decades, many states have been selling their public records to the highest
bidder. Colorado used to sell its motor vehicle information for about $4.4
million a year. Florida offered to sell copies of its motor vehicle information for
$33 million. New York earned $17 million in one year from such sales.
11 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1436 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801-6827 (2000)).
111Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 88 Stat. 571
(1974) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000)) (concerning access and disclosure of
student records).
112 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508,84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)) (creating rules for disclosures of consumer reports).
113Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000)) (making video tape service providers liable for disclosure of personally
identifiable information).
114 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-90-119 (Supp. 2004) (public library user records); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-976 to 38a-999a (Supp. 2004) (Connecticut Insurance Information and
Privacy Protection Act); O.C.G.A. § 46-5-173 (2004) (privacy rights of customers with an
unpublished telephone identification); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 7101-A (Supp. 2004)
(telecommunications privacy); MINN. STAT. § 16 E. 06 (2002) (protecting data submitted to the
office of technology).
1' Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, Tide II, 5 201, 100 Stat.
1860 (Oct. 21, 1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (2000)) (detailing
disclosure prohibitions for those providing "electronic communication service[s]" and "remote
computing service[s] to the public" and providing exceptions); Henry M. Cooper, The Electronic
CommunicationsPrivayAct: Does theAnswer to the InternetInformationPrivay ProblemI 'e in a Fifteen-YearOld FederalStatuteA DetailedAnaysis,20J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 2 (2001).
116 See Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-728
(Oct. 21,1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000)) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission
to promulgate regulations that require website operators or online services that collect personal
information from children under thirteen to provide notice of information collection and disclosure
practices, to obtain parental consent "for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information
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Congress has not been the only legislative body to enact technology privacy
legislation. In 2001, New York, confronting the issue of privacy in the information age, enacted its Internet Security and Privacy Act."1
4. Information Privay at its Fullest. Professor Jerry Kang uses the Information
Infrastructure Task Force's definition of information privacy, stating that:
"Information privacy is 'an individual's claim to control the terms under which
personal information-information identifiable to the individual-is acquired,
disclosed, and used.' ",18 At the heart of this definition is the phrase "personal
information.""' 9 In the definition, the term "personal" refers to the notion that
20
the information is traceable to an individual.1
Kang describes three ways in which information can be traceable to an
individual. First, information may have an authorship relation. 2 ' Second,
information can bear "a descriptive relation."'" Third, information may be
identifiable in the form of an artificial "mapping relation.' 123 The first category
24
includes information authored by the individual such as an e-mail or letter.
Information with a descriptive relationship includes information that is
biological, 12 biographical, 126 or social 127 in nature as well as information about the
activities of an individual such as the details of a purchase or visit to a website 2 s
Information not bearing an authorship or descriptive relationship may be
personal in the sense of information privacy if it is linked to the individual "for
institutional identification, secured access, or provision of some service or
good."'29 Typically, mapping information is in no way related to the individual
outside the institutional system. 30 Examples of mapping information include
social security numbers, network passwords, and personal identification numbers
(PINs) for automatic teller machines.13 1 Components of a digital signature, to the

from children," and to require "reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and
integrity of personal information collected from children").
117 Internet Security and Privacy Act, N.Y. TECH. LAW % 201-207 (2003).
11 Jerry Kang, Infomaion Privay in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (1998).
n Kang, supra note 118, at 1206.

Id. at 1206-07.
Id at 1207.
122 Id.
120

121
123

Id.

124

Id.

12'

For example, height, weight, blood type.

126

For example, birth date, sexual orientation, criminal history.

12

For example, membership in religious and political groups.

128

Kang, supra note 118, at 1207.

129 Id. at

1207-08.

130Id. at 1208.
131

Id.
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extent those components are like passwords, and some electronic signature
information would fall within this category. Some information may fall into
multiple categories; for example, the use of a mother's maiden name as a
password is both an instrumentally mapped and a descriptive piece of information. 132
In order to understand the meaning of the term "personal information" fully,
it is helpful to understand the concept of nonpersonal information. Nonpersonal
information is not traceable to an individual, and thus not private under the
definition of information privacy.133 Three categories of nonpersonal information
exist: information that is not about a human being, anonymous information that
may not be linked to a specific individual, and information directly identifiable to
a group but only indirectly identifiable to an individual within that group) 34 One
information in this third category is a stock price
example of clearly nonpersonal
1 35
for a large corporation.
The courts have not clearly recognized information privacy defined as such.
Instead, the case law reveals a tendency of courts to apply what Professor Solove
calls "the secrecy paradigm," a conception that privacy is not protected after
'
Application of the secrecy paradigm is
information has been disclosed."136
inadequate,'
however, because of the threat of databases "to freedom in
general.., that implicates the type of society we are becoming, the way we think,
our place in the larger social order, and our ability to exercise meaningful control
over our lives."' 38 Professor Solove argues that the fear of surveillance and "Big
Brother" is misdirected in the context of databases and information storage by the
government and private entities in part because much of our personal information, including financial information, gender, race, marital status, and occupation,
is not embarrassing.'39 Instead of Orwell's 1984 Big Brother model, Solove would
use Kafka's The Trial as the model to which drafters of privacy policy should
eschew."4 Databases pose a threat because of the manner in which bureaucratic
processes treat individuals and their information.' 4 ' Through bureaucratic
processes, government officials collect and disseminate personal information

132

Id.

Id
134Id. at

133

1208-10.
Id.at 1210.
136 Solove, supra note 43, at 1176-84.
137Id at 1177 ("In the Information Age, this paradigm is outmoded, and it could lead to the
13

practical extinction of privacy.").
138

Solove, smpra note 84, at 1418-19.

1'39Id.
at 1418-26.
140

14

Id.
Id.at 1422.
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without using discretion. In this system, no individual is permitted to make
decisions about his information. 4 2 For example, state and federal open records
laws require state agencies to release information without regard to how it may
affect an individual.'43 Databases, as well as the manner in which information
contained in them is used, effectively disempower individuals by removing any
control these individuals have over their personal information.'44
A more effective privacy regime would provide individuals with some control
over information that potentially affects employment, professional licensure, and
credit. 4 Privacy should also allow individuals to correct errors or expunge data
in government databases.'46 Insofar as information privacy, as defined above,
departs from what Solove terms "the secrecy paradigm,' 4 it is an important step
in addressing the real problems with information in databases.
G. THE INCREASING NEED FOR PRIVACY LEGISLATION

1. The Need for Legislation Generally. Public records and the information in
them were once relatively inaccessible. 4 8 Even with a growing government
bureaucracy-meaning more information in the hands of the government-and
open records laws, until very recently there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy "not in the sense that the information [would] be completely shielded
from public access, but in the sense that for the most part, it [would] be lost in a
sea of information about millions of people."' 49 As public access increased, that
expectation was no longer well founded.' 50 As Professor Lillian BeVier points

142 Id. ("Bureaucratic decisionmaking processes are being exercised ever more frequently over a

greater sphere of our lives, and we have little power or say within such a system, which tends to
structure our participation along standardized ways that fail to enable us to achieve our goals, wants,
and needs.").
' See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119; O.C.G.A. § 5018-72.
144 Solve, supra note 84, at 1423. The facts contained in databases "fail to tell the entire story"
but important decisions are made based on those limited facts. Id. at 1424.
141 Id. at 1426.
146 Id.
147 Solove, supra note 43, at 1176-84 (discussing the "secrecy paradigm" and related cases).
148 Id. at 1178.
149 Id.
" Id.; Amy Harmon, As Public Records Go Online, Some Say Thy're Too Public,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
24,2001, at Al (quoting Deirdre Mulligan, director of the Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic
at the University of California at Berkeley law school). Harmon states:
At the time many of the public records laws on the books came about there was
no need to build privacy safeguards in because there was no threat... [nlow
people are being forced to say those government records contain some
exceedingly detailed information about people's personal lives, and the cost of

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/8

20

Van Cise: The Georgia Open Records Law Electronic Signature Exception: The
2005]

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXCEPTION

out, even prior to computers "information was difficult to protect from
unwarranted disclosure" because information is easily stolen and thefts are seldom
5
detected since victims rarely know that anything has been lost.1 1 BeVier discusses
two features of technology that explain why computer technology has exacerbated
the problem.1 2 First, computers allow for the efficient compilation and
comparison of data. 5 3 This means that the information that was "lost in a sea of
information ' 5 4 before can be quickly searched and reorganized to fit the user's
needs. The benefits of this efficiency are obvious. For example, "computer
profiling, which searches for specified elements or combinations of elements in
a number of different record systems," can help identify possible tax evaders and
narcotics dealers.' 55 On the other hand, there are negative effects. For instance,
the other side of profiling is that government officials may "go on 'fishing
expeditions' rather than targeting their investigations to people reasonably
6
suspected of crime" or use information in racially or otherwise biased ways.'
57
Second, new technology disseminates government control of information.'
Computer records systems are linked via telecommunications systems, which
results in both more information being exchanged and more people accessing that
information.1 8 The United States Department of Justice Office of Information
Privacy wrote in 1990 that "no development in the history of the [FOIA] has held
even the very future of its implemenas much potential for shaping its contours,
159
tation, as that of new technology."'
2. Examples of the Misuse of Information Obtained Through Open Records Laws. In
1998, Dateline detailed the story of one woman who has lived in fear since she

151
152
153

public participation ...is not appropriately going to be paid with our privacy.
BeVier, supra note 82, at 472.
Id.
Id. at 473 (referring to this feature with the term "multifunctionality"); Schwartz, supra note

61, at 587 (describing the term "data matching," defined as "the electronic comparison of two or
more sets of records in order to find individuals included in more than one data base," as a process
that clearly makes compilation of information easier).
154 See supra text accompanying note 149.
155 BeVier, supra note 82, at 473.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 474; see also Schwartz, supranote 61, at 587-88 ("The federal government now carries out
data matching on billions of records. One survey of only a small portion of federal matching
programs identified data exchanges in one five-year period involving seven billion records. Single
matches have been carried out on as many as fifteen million records.").
158 BeVier, supra note 82, at 474.
supra note 6, at 66 (quoting Office of Information and Privacy, Department of
159Cate et al.,
at
Justice, Department of Justice Report on "Electronic Record" FOIA Issues 3 (1990); see also id.
67 ("[A]pplying the FOIA to electronic agency records exacerbates the significant invasion of
personal privacy and intrusion into organizational decision-making occasioned by requesting
information having nothing to do with government activities.').
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learned that her ex-boyfriend, imprisoned for murder, obtained her address under
a state FOIA. 160 Even more chilling is the tragedy of Amy Boyer. In 1999, a high
school classmate of Boyer, Liam Youens, "who had been obsessed with Boyer
since junior high school, paid Docusearch Inc.... about $150 for Boyer's Social
Security number and other information, including her work address. 1 61 After
162
obtaining the information, Youens shot and killed Boyer as she left work.
Although Youens did not obtain the information directly from a government
agency, "information brokers . . . compile public records from different
government entities and corporations throughout the U.S. to
develop databases,
163
from which [these information brokers] pull information.'
H. OPEN RECORDS LAW: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE EXCEPTIONS

Georgia law excepts from public disclosure "[p]ublic records containing
information that would disclose or might lead to the disclosure of any component
in the process used to execute or adopt an electronic signature, if such disclosure
would or might cause the electronic signature to cease being under the sole
control of the person using it.'""M Similarly, Ohio, within its UETA, removes
"[riecords that would disclose or may lead to the disclosure of records or
information that would jeopardize the state's continued use or security of any
computer or telecommunications devices or services associated with electronic
signatures, electronic 65records, or electronic transactions" from public records
subject to disclosure.
III.

DISCUSSION

States approach the unique problem posed by the interaction of privacy law,
open records law, technology-neutral electronic signature law, and rapidly
changing technology differently. The Georgia Legislature seems to have used an

16 See Solove, supra note 43, at 1173 (describing Dateline (NBC television broadcast Oct. 30,

1980). Professor Solove notes that:
The prisoner ... claimed that he was the father of her child and needed the
address because he wanted to file a paternity suit. This story illustrates why it is
important for people to be able to obtain certain information about others, yet
also demonstrates the dangers and threat to privacy caused by the ready
availability of information.
...Barnes, spra note 86.
162 Id.
163

Id.

I- O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(12) (2002).
165 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1306.23 (Supp. 2004).
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imperfect approach, inadvertently creating a broad exception to its open records
law. The current law fails to reflect the policies typical of Georgia open records
law and creates an unintended privacy exception. Although the Georgia
Legislature effectively produced technology-neutral electronic signature
legislation, it likely created a larger privacy exception than intended.
A. THE HISTORY OF CHANGES IN THE GEORGIA LAW AND HOW THE BROAD
EXCEPTION WAS CREATED

In 1996, the Georgia Digital Signature Task Force (Digital Task Force) drafted
66
The
a digital signature bill patterned after the Utah digital signature statute.
legislature considered the bill in the 1996 legislative session but the bill was
tabled.16 The Digital Task Force drafted a different, simpler bill, Senate Bill 103,
patterned after Florida's Electronic Signature Act of 1996.168 Senate Bill 103 not
only defined the term "electronic signature" but also added the electronic
signature exception to the Open Records Statue.'69 Georgia did not define the
term "electronic signature" broadly as Florida had; 7 ° rather, Senate Bill 103
confined the definition of electronic signature to those methods having the
qualities of a digital signature.' 7' As the law existed from 1997 to 1999, the
electronic signature exception was not overly broad and posed no real threat to
transparency. Then, in 1999, Georgia amended the Georgia Electronic Records
and Signatures Act to change the definitions.1 72 According to one commentator,
the legislature made this change in response to "the issue of evolving electronic

166James D. Johnson, Electronic Records and Signatures:Authorize the Use of Electronic Records and

SignaturesInsteadof Written Records and Signatures, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 26 (1997).
167

Id.

Id.; see also text accompanying note 26.
Johnson, supra note 166, at 26; see also 1997 Ga. Laws 1052, §§ 1, 2 (codifying Senate Bill 103).
175 See Act effective May 25, 1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-224 at 838 (defining digital signature
16s
16

first, then defining electronic signature to encompass more than digital signatures).
171 See Act of Apr. 22, 1997, 1997 Ga. Laws 1052, 1053, which states:
'Electronic signature' means an electronic or digital method executed or adopted
by a party with the intent to be bound by or to authenticate a record, which is
unique to the person using it, is capable of verification, is under the sole control
and is linked to data in such a manner that if the data are
of the person using it,
changed the electronic signature is invalidated.
Id. The current Georgia law uses this exact language to define a "secure electronic signature."
O.C.G.A. § 10-12-3(6) (2000). It appears that this was a purposeful choice. SeeJohnson supra note
166, at n.24 (citing a law professor who consulted with the drafters of the legislation and stating that
a signature on a fax would not qualify as an electronic signature). Under the current definition of
electronic signature, a signature on a fax would qualify. See Unif. Elec. Transactions Act com. 7
(1999).
172See Act of Apr. 19, 1999, Pub. L. No. 272, 1999 Ga. Laws 323.
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transactions" and the proposal of a member of the Georgia Electronic Commerce
Association.' 73 The amendment redefined electronic signature very broadly and
created a new term, "secure electronic signature," which followed the exact
language previously used to define electronic signature. 174 This amendment
created a flaw in Georgia law because, while the definitions had been amended,
the legislature failed to modify the exception to the open records statute to
t7
parallel those changes in the definitions of terms. 1
B.

WHEN ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LEGISLATION MEETS OPEN RECORDS LAWS

The Georgia Legislature may have inadvertently created just the kind of
exception proponents of privacy would have drafted. By using general, overly
broad statutory language in order to become technology-neutral, 76 the legislature
created a loophole in the open records law that agencies can use to withhold
documents that would have necessarily been disclosed under the law prior to
1999. The statutory language "would disclose or might lead to the disclosure
of"177 allows for considerable discretion. Furthermore, the definition of the term
"electronic signature" is given such a broad definition that essentially any record
containing personally identifiable information may be lawfully withheld from
17 8
public disclosure.
In 1990, the Georgia Supreme Court decided the case of Dooley v. Davidson,
which arose out of a dispute over whether certain records were subject to
disclosure under the Open Records Act.'79 Examining the records at issue in the
Dooly case is illustrative of the broad privacy implications of Georgia's current
law.

"'3 Jones, supra note 15, at 7.
Act of Apr. 19, 1999, Pub. L. No. 272, 1999 Ga. Laws 323.
175 The Georgia open records statute states, "For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'electronic
174

signature' has the same meaning as that term is defined in Code Section 10-12-3." O.C.G.A. § 5018-72(a)(12) (2002).
176 See supra Parts II.B and III.A.
177 O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(12).
178 Georgia defines "electronic signature" as "a signature created, transmitted, received, or stored
by electronic means." O.C.G.A. § 10-12-3(3) (2000). Within that definition, the definitions of
"electronic" and "signature" expand the breadth of what is included in a Georgia "electronic
signature." See O.C.G.A. § 10-12-3(1) (" 'Electronic' means, without limitation, analog, digital,
electronic, magnetic, mechanical, optical, chemical, electromagnetic, electromechanical, electrochemical, or other similar means."); O.C.G.A. § 10-12-3(7) (" 'Signature' means any symbol or method that
a person causes to be attached to or logically associated with a record with the intent to sign such
record.").
179 397 S.E.2d 922, 923 (Ga. 1990).
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In Doo~y, two newspapers requested records concerning the income, including
income from sources outside the University, of all University of Georgia
coaches. 8 ° The coaches produced thirteen documents in response to discovery
motions.' 8 ' Documents One, Two, and Three were reports prepared by the
coaches concerning outside income. 18 2 Document Four was a contract obligating
a coach to make speaking appearances on behalf of a manufacturer. 183 Documents Five, Six, Seven, Ten, and Thirteen were contracts between coaches and
suppliers of sports equipment and apparel. 8 4 Documents Eight and Nine were
letters relating to compensation for participation in radio programs.' 8 Document
Eleven contained financial information regarding promotional radio and television
broadcasts.' 86 Document Twelve was a contract with the producer of a radio
network obligating a coach to provide commentary during the broadcast of select
basketball games. 87
At issue in the case was whether the records before the court were public
records under Georgia law.' 88 For reasons not relevant to this Note, the court
found that ten of the thirteen documents were public records subject to disclosure
under the law.' 89 Seven of the thirteen documents were contracts. 90 Of those
seven, the court determined only the five contracts between the sports equipment
and apparel suppliers were public records under title 50, section 72(a) of the
Georgia Code.' 9' The court found the two letters, Documents Eight and Nine,
to be public records subject to disclosure under the law.' 92 Under the current law,

180 Id.

181Id. at 927.
182Id. at 926.
183 Id.
184 Id
185
186
187
188

Id

Id.
Id
See id. at 924. The court applied title 50, chapter 18, section 72(a) of Georgia Code, which has

been modified only slightly since the case was decided. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a) (listing the
additional phrase "computer based or generated information" within the classification of the term

"public records").

189 Dooly, 397 S.E.2d at 926-27.
The decision in Dooley is based primarily on whether the
documents were "prepared maintained or received in the course of the operation of a public office
or agency." Id.at 924-27. The illustrative nature of the case comes not in the court's reasoning, but
in the fact that were the exact facts of this case to arise today, while the same eleven documents
would be found to be public records, at most four would be subject to disclosure because of the
broad electronic signature exception.

190Id. at 926.
191 Id.
192

Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2005

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 8
J. INTELL PROP. L[

[Vol. 12:567

while the same five contracts and the two letters are still public records,1 93 the
electronic signature exception194 would likely apply to except each of these
documents from disclosure.
Presumably, at least one person signed each of the contracts and the two
letters.' 9 The physical signatures on the documents place the contracts within the
electronic signature exception. The signature on the letter or contract (or a
signature on a memorandum, letter, or check) "would disclose or might lead to
the disclosure of any component in the process used to execute or adopt an
electronic signature,"1' 96 because the possessor of that written signature could scan
the document into an image-based file, such as a .pdf file, and the act of
converting the writing into an electronic format would make that file a component of"a signature stored by electronic means," and thus, an electronic signature
under the current law.' 97 This example reveals that no document with any
individual's signature on it would be subject to disclosure. Thus, no document
signed by the governor or an agency official would fall outside the exception, and
the open records law would fail in its purpose.
Assuming that the reports prepared by the coaches (Documents One, Two,
and Three) 198 were not physically signed, the same analysis could not stand.
Nonetheless, the electronic signature exception may apply. The mere existence
of a name on the piece of paper is arguably a "component in the process used to
execute or adopt an electronic signature."' 199 This is so because even a typed name
at the bottom of an e-mail can serve as an electronic signature;00 thus, possession
of the coaches' names could be sufficient to qualify. The court would likely reject
this argument as nonsensical since a name is easily obtained, particularly when it
is a college coach's name and no harm could be done by the release of the name.
If the court considered the fact that the additional information in the document
might enable someone to produce a more convincing e-mail message, however,
then the argument for nondisclosure might hold up in court. This is, of course,

193 Because the relevant statute has been modified only slightly and the Georgia supreme court

has not overruled Dooley, there is no reason to believe that a Georgia court would find the five
contracts or two letters not public records.

194O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(12).

19 See id.(evaluating contracts).

196O.C.G.A. §50-18-72(a)(12).
197O.C.G.A. § 10-12-3(3) (" 'Electronic signature' means a signature created, transmitted,
received, or stored by electronic means and includes but is not limited to a secure electronic
signature.').
198 Id.
199 O.C.G.A. 50-18-72(12).
2o See supra note 18.
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more of a security issue than a privacy issue, but the language of the statute does
not necessarily foreclose such arguments.
The final document released in the Dooley case was Document Eleven, which
"concerns financial information relative to radio and television broadcasts."20 1 If
the name argument described above were unavailable for this document-that is,
if the financial information provided no name-a reasonable argument against
disclosure would probably not exist. If no personal information, such as a social
security number, bank account number, or name, was in the document and it
consisted solely of numbers, the electronic signature exception would probably
not exempt the document from disclosure.
In sum, the facts of the Doo/y case applied under current law demonstrate the
potentially sweeping effects of the electronic signature exception. In the actual
case, eleven documents were released. Under the current law, it is likely that, at
most, only four of the documents would be subject to disclosure. Similarly, a
large number of government documents that were formerly subject to disclosure
are now exempt under the electronic signature exception.
C. THE PROBLEM OF USING THE EXCEPTION

Even though Georgia now has a very broad exception to disclosure, the full
implications of the exception may never be realized. First, because most people
will never know that records containing their personal information are being
released, there may be little opportunity for challenge. The only people who
might deploy the exception to prevent the release of records are those working
for agencies or their attorneys. In most instances, the agency would prefer to
disclose a record over withholding a record and incurring court costs. Only when
entities subject to public records laws fear fraud are they likely to aggressively
argue the electronic signature exception. One example might be a university
which is asked to disclose checks to a requester. Fearing fraud, a university might
search for a reason not to disclose the record20 2 and find that the electronic
signature exception is the only available argument for nondisclosure. It is possible
that an individual could learn of a potential disclosure, as the coaches in the Dooley
case did, and argue that the statue mandates nondisclosure. Outside such a
situation, however, there is little chance of the exception being deployed.

201

See Dooley, 397 S.E.2d at 926.

202 See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(h) (providing that "the public officer or agency having control of
such record or records, if access to such record or records is denied in whole or in part, shall specify
in writing the specific legal authority exempting such record or records from disclosure, by Code
section, subsection, and paragraph').
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Second, the law expressly provides that title 50, chapter 18, section 72 of the
Georgia Code "shall be interpreted narrowly.""'3 Taking this language in
conjunction with the purpose of the open records law, it is possible that courts
would reject arguments for nondisclosure based on the electronic signature
exception. Still, the plain language of the statute is very broad, and even a narrow
interpretation of the terms "may" and "might lead to" gives the exception broad
reach.
D. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT

The simplest and best solution, and one that comports with the general intent
of the open records statute, is to restrict the amount of information within the
exception. The exception would be far less expansive if the phrase "electronic
signature" were changed to "secure electronic signature" as defined by the same
statutory section.2 ' This change would make the law more logical and serve to
close the current loophole. In terms of logic, it makes sense to keep all the
components of a secure electronic signature "under the sole control of the person
using it."205 On the other hand, from a security standpoint, it makes no sense for
the components of an electronic signature to be under the sole control of the
person using it simply because electronic signature has such a broad definition.
The Georgia Legislature likely either did not understand or did not consider the
implications of this exception. The history of the open records electronic
signature exception and the electronic signature law seems to indicate that the
legislature overlooked the reference to the definitional portion of the electronic
signature statute contained in title 50, chapter 18, section 72(a)(12) when the
legislature amended the electronic signature law.206
IV.

CONCLUSION

Advances in technology facilitating electronic commerce and the attempts to
shape the law to foster electronic commerce rather than restrict it have resulted
in technology-neutral electronic signature legislation. This effort to encourage
electronic commerce has created ripples in other fields of the law. One such field
is government record keeping and public access to those records. Public access
to government records is a mainstay of the federal and state governments under
the rationale that the press and the public will serve as watchdogs over the

'03

O.C.G.A. 5 50-18-72(g).

20 O.C.G.A. S 10-12-3.
205

Id.

2

See infra Part III.A.
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government. Information privacy is also intertwined in the field of government
records and public access to those records. Information privacy concerns extend
even beyond government records into the arena of privately held documents-particularly those held by businesses engaged in marketing efforts or
selling information to other businesses or individuals.
In adapting its law to facilitate electronic commerce, the Georgia Legislature
has upset the prior balance of privacy and open records in the state and created
an overly broad exception to the general requirement of disclosure of government
records. Georgia should amend its open records law in order to revert to a state
with a generous policy for the disclosure of government records even though it
does create a potential source of privacy protection. The history of the Georgia
Electronic Records and Signatures Act seems to indicate that the exception was
created inadvertently. Privacy could be better protected with intentional
legislation aimed at providing information privacy. The simple addition of the
word "secure" to the open records electronic signature exception will close the
current loophole, and the Georgia Legislature should therefore adopt this
addition.
MICHAEL L. VAN CISE
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